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This paper examines the implications for political legitimacy of the funda-
mental structural changes taking place in the Saudi Arabian economy. 
Traditionally the Saudi Royal Family has based its legitimacy on its abili-
ty to provide a wide variety of services and subsidies to its citizens. In addi-
tion government expenditures in Saudi Arabia have provided the main eco-
nomic stimulus. With declining oil revenues, diminishing returns on gov-
ernment expenditure and severe cutbacks in economic services to sustain 
defence expenditures, the Royal Family is losing much of its traditional 
justification for rule. The paper concludes that the only way the regime will 
be able to sustain its legitimacy is through opening up the political system 
to greater participation. This will first involve increased economic freedom, 
with political freedom following the successful transition to a private sec-
tor led economy. 
Introduction 
After more than twenty years of relatively high oil revenues certain 
realities appear to be setting in for the Saudi Arabian Royal Family. 
In particular, the economy remains overwhelmingly dominated by the 
petroleum sector (Flanders, 1985; Kanovsky, 1994; Looney, 1995). 
While considerable industrial diversification into non-oil sectors has 
been achieved, the results, other than those achieved by the Saudi 
Arabian Basic Industry Corporation (SABIC) have been below expec-
tations. It is apparent that adequate demand can not be maintained 
without a steady infusion of government expenditures. 
Oil revenues aside, government expenditures appear to be loosing 
their effectiveness in stimulating private investment. In turn the pro-
ductivity of private sector investment is falling and its ability to stim-
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ulate non-oil GDP growth appears to be very limited. In the past polit-
ical stability and generous subsidies have been essential to induce 
local investors to become involved in the economy. The gulf conflicts, 
together with slack oil markets have undermined this approach 
towards the economy (Kanovsky, 1995). 
The main proposition developed in the sections that follow is that 
in the future the Saudi Royal Family will have to sustain its legiti-
macy through demonstrating that it is capable of adapting in ways 
that are compatible with sustained economic growth. In doing so the 
government will have to structure its liberalization programs in ways 
that stimulate private sector development and investment. In this 
regard, increased economic freedom will likely proceed any movement 
toward political liberalization (Field, 1994). 
Overview 
During oil boom years Saudi Arabia (Looney and Frederiksen, 
1985; Nehme, 1994; Prestly and Westaway, 1989) and the other GCC 
States were economies characterized (Chaudhry, 1989; Nagi, 1982; 
Looney 1989a) by the lack of binding budgetary constraints which, in 
turn, reduced and sometimes even eliminated the need to set spend-
ing priorities and allocate scarce economic resources. Financial 
resources were so large that even with a highly skewed income distri-
bution all sectors of society saw some measure of improvement in 
their standard of living. Unemployment was unimaginable as govern-
ments showed a seemingly infinite capacity to hire both citizens and 
foreigners in public jobs. 
The oil boom created a lasting legacy which in turn is now stifling 
growth and development in the region. In particular the oil boom 
(Luciani, 1994; Zanoyan, 1995): 
• Created a parallel escape from politics in which ruling elites rarely 
faced the need to share power, renew their legitimacy and credibil-
ity or tolerate any meaningful public debate over major economic, 
social or political issues such as oil and budgetary policy. 
• Brought about a system which had neither taxation nor represen-
tation. 
Perhaps the greatest burden imposed by the oil boom years was the 
creation of an illusion that the oil bonanza would last indefinitely. 
This has result in government's being slow to adapt to the new reali-
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ty of lower revenues. In particular, governments ran chronic deficits 
averaging well in excess of 5 per cent of GDP, reaching 15 per cent in 
Saudi Arabia. Budget shortfalls were almost entirely reflected in the 
external accounts, leading to large current account deficits (Murray, 
1995). 
In most cases, external and domestic deficits in the Gulf region 
were initially financed by drawing down the substantial foreign 
resources accumulated during the 1970s and early 1980s. With excep-
tion of the UAE (United Arab Emirates) most gulf countries depleted 
their assets and turned to borrowing which for the first time exposed 
their economies and economic policies to serious international scruti-
ny. Governments have finally responded by reducing spending-Saudi 
Arabia has had some major reductions in expenditures and increases 
in many fees for services. 
In addition several longer run structural problems are confronting 
the Saudi Authorities. The kingdom's population is growing rapidly. 
According to most projections, population growth will average 3.5% pa 
over the next five years. Some 60% of the population is less than 24 
years old, and the 15-24 age group is the fastest-growing in the coun-
try. Even economic growth of 3.8% per annum, as expected under the 
new five-year plan, will barely generate enough jobs for a labour force 
expanding at these rates. In addition, some fear that employment lev-
els could actually fall because of technological advances and increas-
ingly capital-intensive investment. This would leave a rising number 
of young nationals chasing even fewer jobs. 
Public-sector employment has become a means of disguising unem-
ployment, and government jobs are still seen as having a high status 
(Aarts, 1995). Nevertheless, low oil prices have put increased strain 
on Saudi government finances. With wages and salaries accounting 
for almost 50% of government spending, rationalization has become 
unavoidable. This is unlikely to mean redundancies. The government 
will rely on natural attrition, in combination with a freeze on new 
recruitment, to cut its wage bill. 
Bringing in expatriate workers has been a major factor in Saudi 
Arabia's economic development. The government now feels that the 
economic and fiscal costs are growing too fast and without commen-
surate benefits. Foreign workers are a major burden on the state's 
finances-like everyone else in Saudi Arabia,, they are not liable for 
income or sales tax. However, they do enjoy free government services, 
in particular free health care. In addition, foreign workers in the king-
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dom sent home almost $16 billion in earnings in 1993, thereby con-
tributing to a current-account deficit of $14.2bn (equivalent to around 
15% of GDP). 
The authorities recognize that preventive action is needed if these 
problems are not to worsen. Thus, the new development plan sets out 
measures to increase the job opportunities for Saudi nationals. This 
may mean restrictions on the recruitment of expatriates into skilled 
and semi-skilled jobs. The government may also publish "targets" for 
private-sector companies, while tying government financing to 
progress on Saudiisation. 
These measures are hardly draconian, and it is clear that pressure 
on the government to create jobs is less severe than in neighbouring 
countries, where unemployment is more of a problem. Saudi Arabia 
will therefore persist in its cautious approach to "localization" -the 
Minister of Health said recently that it would take at least 4 7 years 
to get Saudis into only 62% of jobs in the Saudi Arabia health sector. 
Saudi Arabian Growth Patterns 
Another way of identifying some of the underlying problems cur-
rently facing the Saudi authorities is through examining the changes 
in several key macroeconomic relationships that occurred during the 
1980s and into the 1990s. With regard to the all important pattern of 
investment: 
• Government investment as a share of non-oil GDP has declined 
fairly dramatically since 1979, a pattern that also appears associ-
ated with the government's fiscal deficits. 
• On the other hand private investment has retained a fairly stable 
share of non-oil gap, although experiencing a slight downward 
trend. 
• The fiscal deficit share of non-oil GDP peaked in 1987 and after 
that date stabilized somewhat with regard to its share of non-oil 
gap. 
Several interesting patterns have also developed with regard to 
consumption: 
• As with its investment, the public sector's consumption has 
declined with regard to its share of non-oil GDP. 
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• Also as with investment, government consumption has shown a 
slight tendency in recent years to increase its share of non-oil GDP. 
• Private consumption has also experienced a gradual decline with 
regard to non-oil GDP. This expenditure category appears to be sta-
bilizing at slightly over sixty per cent of non-oil GDP. 
Finally several distinct patterns characterize the pattern of total 
private and public sector expenditures: 
• AB with consumption and investment, both private and public sec-
tor expenditures have fallen with regard to the country's non-oil 
GDP. 
• The decline in private sector expenditures has been more stable, 
with public sector expenditures experiencing much greater fluctua-
tion. 
• The decline in public sector expenditures (as indicated by its trend) 
has also been somewhat sharper than in the case of private expen-
ditures. 
• GDP associated with the oil sector has shown the greatest fluctua-
tion of all, falling below non-oil GDP for the first time in 1983. Since 
that date oil GDP seems to be stabilizing at somewhere between 40-
60 per cent of non-oil GDP. 
Numerous statistical tests (Looney 1989, 1989a, 1992, 1994a) for 
several of the key linkages between government expenditures, private 
sector investment and the non-oil economy reveal that several key 
patterns characterize the 1970-82 period. Most import for longer run 
growth is the link between private investment and non-oil GDP. 
• During this period private investment had a positive impact on 
non-oil GDP. This relationship was not particularly strong, but it 
did indicate that the private sector's activities were flowing into 
productive ventures. 
• Private investment itself was mainly stimulated by defence expen-
ditures, non-infrastructural investment. Government consumption 
and infrastructure investment provided considerably less of a stim-
ulus to private investment. 
• Non-oil GDP received its strongest stimulus from government con-
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sumption, followed by defence expenditures. Ironically infra struc-
tural investment had a negative impact on the growth in non-oil 
GDP. 
While other researchers (Metwakky and Ghars El-Din, 1996) have 
arrived at more optimistic conclusions, several distinct changes 
appear to have taken place since 1982. The most important of which 
was the severing of the link between private investment and non-oil 
GDP. In particular, non-oil GDP was also no longer simulated by 
defence expenditures or government consumption. In addition the 
country may not be able to effectively utilize monetary policy (Rosser 
and Sheehan, 1995). Several other patterns were also of importance: 
• The only macro variable that had a statistically significant link 
with non-oil GDP was non-infrastructural investment and this link 
was rather weak. 
• Private investment's link with defence expenditures weakened dur-
ing this period, but was still positive. In contrast the stimulus pro-
vided by government consumption strengthened during this period. 
On the other hand, the earlier stimulus provided by non-infra-
structural investment shifted to a negative impact. 
• A major change from the earlier period was the shift from private 
sector investment affecting private consumption to that of private 
consumption providing a stimulus to private investment. 
No doubt part of the declining effectiveness of government expen-
ditures stems from the fact that defence expenditures account for over 
thirty per cent of the government's budget. The real problem however 
is in the manner in which defence expenditures interact with other 
budgetary categories. Although Saudi Arabian budgetary categories 
differ from the standard IMF classification, the country appears to fol-
low fairly closely the budgetary patterns characteristic of other high 
defence burden middle eastern countries (Looney, 1991, 1992a, 1993, 
1994, 1994a). 
• In particular increases in expected defence come largely at the 
expense of economic services. In addition, these reductions carry 
over to transportation/communication and infrastructure. 
• These categories are also reduced when the government experi-
ences fiscal stress in the form of unanticipated increases in the fis-
cal deficit, with economic services also reduced with expansion in 
the anticipated deficit. However the Kingdom's various subsidies 
are often funded with unexpected increases in the fiscal deficit. 
• Also characteristic of high defence countries, allocations to human 
resource development are increased along with expanded defence 
expenditures. 
• In addition to economic services, Saudi Arabia tends to reduce allo-
cations to municipal services and government lending programs 
during periods of expanded defence expenditures. 
Saudi infrastructure is facing severe capacity shortages because of 
its defence expenditure burden together with the enormous pace of 
economic development over the past 20 years, coupled with poor 
maintenance. The government wants to construct extra capacity, but 
could have difficulty financing this, given its aversion to foreign debt. 
Attempts have also been made to dampen infrastructural demand via 
tariff increases, but these increases have been insufficient. 
The government will be compelled to confront the issue of expatri-
ate-dependence in the next few years. Saudi Arabia is a reluctant host 
to nearly 5 million expatriates, on whom the country depends for its 
cheap labour, and almost all of its technical and managerial work-
force. Yet because of rapid population growth, rising unemployment 
among young Saudis is becoming an increasingly contentious issue. 
Even if oil revenues pick up, there will have to be a major structural 
change in the environment the private sector operates in before that 
sector will be capable of generating self sustained growth and suffi-
cient employment opportunities for the growing Saudi workforce. 
The implications of these relationships, together with an overview 
of the main political economy linkages are outlined in Figures 1 and 
2. Clearly, the authorities will have a difficult time undertaking nec-
essary economic reforms due to vested interests, both within and out-
side of the government. On the other hand, the stagnation of non-oil 
Gross Domestic Product together with the inability of the government 
to maintain its role as the initiator of growth, makes these reforms 
imperative. 
Although government emphasizes its basic commitment to free 
enterprise, it maintains a monopoly role in the oil sector and a virtu-
al monopoly in infrastructure development and the provision of most 
utilities and communications services. Moreover the government 
appears to prefer public-private ventures in key heavy industries. 
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While there may be only limited privatization in the near future, 
Saudi government is likely to expecting private sector to provide a 
growing proportion of financing for infrastructure projects: 
• Objective of Sixth Development Plan (1995-99) is to place increased 
reliance on private sector involvement in capital formation within 
the kingdom. Likely to contract out some utilities to private sector 
and sell off parts of the basic industries or another tranche of 
SABIC (already 30% publicly owned). 
• Increased use of private capital (estimated $150) to finance govern-
ment projects. 
• More foreign investment in joint ventures 
• Offset program to be expanded to include large scale civilian pro-
jects. 
Summing up, economic policy in the 1990s will be difficult (Dunn, 
1995), and will be largely aimed at reducing the twin current-account 
and fiscal deficits. No doubt the authorities will attempt to do this 
without introducing new taxes or recourse to direct foreign borrowing. 
Deficit financing will be undertaken mostly with treasury bills and 
development bonds with external borrowing a last resort. In this 
regard, government domestic borrowing will crowd out private invest-
ment, making transition to a new growth path difficult, financing of 
current account deficits difficult without eventual external public bor-
rowing. Repatriation of private capital increasingly necessary to 
finance this gap (Moham, 1992). Clearly the Saudi Royal Family's 
willingness to cooperate with the private sector will be critical in 
affecting the future course of the economy and political system. 
Issues in Regime Legitimacy 
AB Professor Nakhleh (1994) has noted, however, prior to Gulf War, 
the Saudi Royal Family had rejected participation on the grounds oil 
wealth permitted them to provide citizens with free health, education 
and welfare services without collecting any taxes. The lubricant of 
abundant wealth allowed them to make the transition from classical 
tribalism into urban tribalism. However, he warns that the rentier 
state's ability to provide services is reduced the demands for account-
ability increase. The traditional tribal basis of accommodation 
between the ruler and the ruled becomes less acceptable to those who 
are provided less. At this point, the tribal state begins therefore to 
Looney, Political Legitimacy in Saudi Arabia 39 
apply other methods to enforce allegiance, thereby making it more 
urban and less tribal. The implications of these trends are that 
(Nakhleh, 1994: 120-121): 
• The rentier state is slowly and surely being replace by the security 
forces state. 
• The ruling family has become a regime not much different from 
other authoritarian regimes in the region. 
Factors Responsible for Regime Legitimacy 
The regime's willingness to expand participation is evolving. The 
1980s witnessed adaptation and readjustment. Perhaps the most 
basic characteristic of the Saudi System, at least through the late 
1980s has been its remarkable stability which was the result of: 
• consciously balanced and carefully supported tribal traditions 
• accommodation of religious groups 
• family size and power 
• oil wealth. 
This combination is the heart of traditional political dynamics in 
Saudi Arabia. Over past decade several factors have particularly con-
tributed to this stability: 
• Enormous oil-generated wealth and the widespread distribution of 
this wealth in the society. 
• The size and closeness of the Royal Family. 
• Large expenditures on the armed forces and the corresponding rise 
of a satisfied military officer corps. 
• Presence of a massive infrastructure in commerce, industry, agri-
culture transportation communication and other public services. 
• The ability of the Saudi leadership to adapt to changing social, eco-
nomic, political conditions and demands. 
• The relatively small indigenous population and the dispersing of 
that population throughout the territory. 
In 1990 new factors have begun to disturb the equilibrium . 
• 
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• On social level, the growth of cities and rural to urban migration 
has upset traditional patterns of settlement. In 1970, 26% of the 
population lived in cities. In 1990 it was 73%. 
• Modernization in culture, education and technology has fuelled the 
development of a well- educated, politically conscious middle class. 
This had ripple effects in government and the army, where a tech-
nocratic elite has filled the ranks of an expanded government and 
military bureaucracy. 
• Whereas in 1960 only 2 per cent of girls attended school, the rate 
had increased to 41 per cent by 1981 and exceeded 80 per cent by 
1991. 
• Women now comprise the majority of graduates, though they are 
still excluded from certain :fields-engineering, journalism and 
architecture, and the labour market is practically closed to them. 
• At the highest level a second generation of princes-extremely 
wealthy and foreign educated have shown signs of emerging as a 
powerful political class, distinct from the ruling group of princes. 
The growth in importance of these groups underscores the 
dichotomies that will be the prime source of pressure for Saudi rulers 
in near future (N akhleh, 1994: 1231 24): 
• Traditionalism versus modernity 
• Tribalism versus urbanism 
• Islamic Wahabi social rigidity versus secular mobility 
• Family autocracy versus participatory government and 
• Customary tribal rules of conduct versus written legal regulations. 
The durability of the Saudi political system will be determined by 
the reconciliation of these dichotomies. Within this context, demands 
of democratization will also be fuelled by: 
• shrinkage of oil revenues 
• the competition for government contracts and jobs, and 
• the return of thousands of university graduates from abroad. 
In addition demands for democratization are growing because of 
declining confidence in the ability of the Royal Family to meet current 
challenges (The Economist, 1995): 
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• The main problem is lack of confidence due to the inability of the 
kingdom to defend itself despite purchasing billions of dollars 
worth of highly sophisticated arms, and 
I • the inability to maintain improved standards of living despite still 
receiving $40 billion or so per annum in oil revenues. 
• all these factors will stretch and test the existing domestic political 
structures. 
Political Opposition 
While there are clear incentives for the ruling family to increase 
political participation, the main threat to the regime appears to come 
from disaffected religious groups (Fuller, 1995): Here the main 
lslamist complaints (Dekmejian, 1994) centre around the Royal 
Family's (Murphy, 1994) 
• mis-management of economy 
• personal corruption 
• Lack of adherence to Islamic values, and 
• Close alliance with USA 
Demands made by religious groups (Henderson, 1994) are outlined 
in the 1992 Memorandum of Advice. The Memorandum, signed by 
more than 50 religious scholars, prescribed remedies for the ills of 
Saudi life, calling for: 
• the establishment of a Consultative Council 
• the betting of all regulations to ensure that they accorded with 
Islamic law 
• the cancellation of all taxes 
• the reduction of fees for government services and 
• the removal of usury from the financial system 
The demands with economic content appear to be in opposition to 
the economic reforms needed to put the economy on a new sustainable 
growth path. 
For the present opposition inside kingdom appears to be disorga-
nized. The Royal Family's main problem is that very need to introduce 
austere economic policies during the next five years will raise 
prospect of public dissent. In such a climate the Royal Family faces a 
difficult period of rule. Such difficulties will be compounded by the 
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need to manage a smooth transfer of power and result in internal dis-
putes within the Royal Family. 
The Saudi Royal Family is from the Central region and in recent 
years has succeeded both in imposing the attitudes of the Central 
region on other areas of the kingdom and in having citizens from this 
region assume important positions throughout the kingdom. 
Opposition to this is not openly expressed, but regional differences 
could become important if fissures appear in other areas of Saudi soci-
ety, for example, if there were a prolonged crisis over the succession, 
or chronic economic recession. 
Summing up, the present situation is vigorously testing Saudi 
Arabia's ability to adapt to political dissent and severe economic ratio-
nalization. 
• It is apparent that from a purely economic viewpoint the steps that 
are necessary to reform the economy come into direct conflict with 
basis of the regime's legitimacy and the agenda of the main opposi-
tion groups. 
• The constraints on economic reforms together with flat revenues 
over the remaining years up to the year 2000 will no doubt be a 
source of tension and resistance. 
• In this regard increasing income inequalities may present a major 
problem for the government. 
• Income distribution data for the kingdom are not available, but 
unofficial reports clearly indicate that there is a wide disparity of 
income between Saudis. In particular, King Fahd is thought to have 
assets totalling tens of billions of dollars, while the thousands of 
royal princes and princesses, and well-placed technocrats, are often 
perceived as benefiting financially from their positions. 
• The perception that oil wealth is not fairly distributed is likely to 
become an increasing source of social tension, particularly as the 
government is expected to cut back on subsidies and restructure 
the public sector in its efforts to curb the budget deficit during 
1996-2000. 
• The existing system of subsidies, high leyels of employment in the 
government sector, and free education and health care have helped 
to distribute the kingdom's oil wealth to the ordinary Saudi citizen. 
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Its erosion can only accentuate perceptions of income disparities. 
While there may be only increased discontent, the situation could 
become volatile along the lines of a model originally proposed by 
Hirschman (1973) which centres around problems associated with 
increased inequality, unfilled expectations, and discontent over fur-
ther advancement. Hirschman's model is based on the tunnel effect. 
In this model early tolerance for inequality turns to hostility if those 
who do not advance feel that they never will and those who do 
advance feel that further improvement is impossible because they 
lack the necessary family or tribal ties. 
Conclusions 
Whereas the early oil boom years enabled the Saudi economy and 
society to prosper through a state led development model, the govern-
ment's programs have run into diminishing returns and are no longer 
capable of enabling the country to sustain improvements in the stan-
dard of living. On the other hand, rapid change and regional warfare 
have undermined the private sector's sense of security. 
For some time to come, this insecurity will encourage the private 
sector to preserve existing political arrangements, whereby the gov-
ernment and its external allies provide security while the merchant 
community continues to profit from the oil-based economy Thus, 
rather than take advantage of the government's current problems to 
become an agent of political change, the private sector in Saudi Arabia 
will not attempt to transform its consultative relationship with the 
state into one of competition characteristic of a working democracy. 
Given the combination of traditional Saudi politics based on kin-
ship and exclusion and rapid modernization, the transformation from 
the pre-industrial era has been managed by links between the private 
sector and the state based on patronage attachments and the state's 
distribution of oil wealth. 
Since it is unlikely that the country's political institutions will shed 
these powerful traditional social practices in the near future, the 
shape of politics in the coming decade will not resemble the workings 
of a democracy, even if the private sector acquires greater strength 
than it currently possesses. 
In states like Saudi Arabia, heavily influenced either by the rentier 
effect or by an authoritarian political culture, the agent of change is 
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still the state. Brought into being to increase economic efficiency and 
to relieve the government from much of the pressure to stimulate 
growth and employment, the private sector has achieved neither the 
independence nor the dynamism required to meet the economic and 
employment challenges of the 1990s. 
On the other hand, it is fairly clear that without economic reforms 
(Richards, 1993, 1995; O'Sullivan, 1995) the kingdom's economy will 
stagnate and be incapable of meeting the demands place on it by a 
growing population. The real issue is not whether the kingdom will· 
reform, but rather how far will it take economic reforms and at what 
pace. 
Here, the empirical evidence is not very encouraging. A recent 
examination (Frederiksen and Looney, 1996) of these issues found 
that for a sample of twenty countries, three key ingredients tend to be 
associated with success: (1) existence of a visionary leader, (2) 
whether or not a comprehensive reform program exists, and (3) the 
presence of a crisis in the country. Out of a sample of nineteen coun-
tries, this study found that by simply knowing whether or not these 
three conditions were present was sufficient to predict the outcome in 
all but one country (Mexico). 
Unfortunately, none of these conditions appears to be present in 
Saudi Arabia at the current time. In addition, it should be noted that 
recent studies on economic freedom have placed Saudi Arabia in one 
of the lower groups in terms of the level of freedom currently present. 
On the other hand, the Saudi Royal Family has shown more flexi-
bility and adaptability than it is often given credit for. It is true in the 
current economic crisis that the government was slow to react. 
Whether the reforms made so far are sufficient is not the issue: the 
reforms show that the Saudis can and will tighten the belt and impose 
increased discipline when needed, precisely because they are shrewd 
enough to recognize that the alternative is far worse for their own 
family interests. 
Even though the economic crisis is real and has existed for some 
time, the Kingdom is dealing with it. In another country this might be 
a case of to little to late, but the Saudis still possess enormous 
resources and have barely begun to try to generate available rev-
enues. 
The whole history of the House of Saud suggests that if a leader or 
'.iS· 
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group of leaders proves unable to cope with a challenge to the family 
enterprise, the family will find someone else. There is no shortage of 
trained and capable leaders within the family itself. And in the past 
the family has shown its skill in reviving old tribal links, co-opting 
opponents and responding to popular discontent. In short there is no 
reason to doubt that they will do so again. If they do not, they may 
very will face more serious challenges soon, but their is no reason for 
assuming they will not preempt those challenges has they have done 
so often in the past. 
If the Saudis do not do enough or revert to the denial of some peri-
ods in the past, they may turn what is currently a fairly civilized 
Islamist dissent into a genuine dissident movement. But unlike some 
other Arab ruling establishments, they are unlikely to let that hap-
pen. 
Future Prospects 
In this regard, does the future hold any promise for an expanded 
and more efficient private sector that could play a part in the devel-
opment of pluralistic politics in the kingdom? There are at least three 
reasons why this may occur: 
• Saudi society will have to learn how to compete in a highly com-
petitive international economy based on the instantaneous process-
ing of information. Recent technological revolutions and the impor-
tance of rapid exchanges of massive amounts of information are 
incompatible with a state-led economy. Under these conditions, the 
private sector appears to be well-placed to participate in the coun-
try's gradual economic reform process. 
• The diversification of the economy has reached a point where the 
government must consult with the private sector on the breadth 
and depth of any policy, or, as was the case with the failed Saudi 
attempt in 1988 to tax foreign businesses, suffer a potentially dan-
gerous state failure. 
• Finally, the government will be compelled to expand and rational-
ize the private sector in view of the already established impact of 
high rates of population growth, high expectations produced by the 
oil boom and the continuing external and internal threats to the 
state. Saudi rulers will eventually have to jpcrease the private sec-
tor's political space. They will do this first through capital market 
reforms as in Kuwait, eventually allowing foreign investment and 
I 
I 
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the development of an efficient stock exchange. 
If the government can enact modest reforms that provide more eco-
nomic freedom (Messick, 1996), the longer run prospects for democra-
cy may improve. Robert Barro (1991) has examined the links between 
economic freedom, development and democracy. His findings suggest 
that: 
• The favourable elements for growth include small distortions of 
market prices, and the inclination and ability of the government to 
maintain the rule of law, high levels of health and education, low 
government spending on consumption and a low fertility rate. If 
these variables and the level of per-capita income are held constant, 
the overall effect of more democracy on the growth rate is moder-
ately negative. 
• There is some indication that more democracy raises growth when 
political freedom is low, but depresses growth once a moderate 
amount of freedom has been attained. 
• There is a stronger linkage between economic development and the 
propensity to experience democracy. Specifically, non-democratic 
countries that have achieved high stands of living-measured by 
real per capita GDP, life expectancy and schooling-tend to become 
more democratic over time. Examples include, Chile, South Korea 
and Taiwan. 
• Conversely, democratic countries with low standards of living tend 
to lose political rights. Examples included the newly independent 
African states in the 1970s. 
In conclusion, the Saudi state will be hard pressed to meet its 
employment targets for the growing supply of labour. Improving the 
position and efficiency of the private sector offers a major opportuni-
ty to encourage wealthy Saudi savers to invest in the kingdom. 
Finding a greater role for the private sector in the politics of the coun-
try will broaden the state's legitimacy while weakening the claims of 
populist leaders who offer superficial approaches to modern problems. 
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